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ABSTRACT
How far do the contractual implications of hold-up-based theories (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian
(1978), Williamson (1979, 1985)) extend? I investigate this in the context of trucking. Quasi-rents in
trucking are generally smaller than in the contexts studied in the previous empirical literature. They vary with
hauls’ distance and the thickness of local markets. I find that doubling the thickness of the market increases
the likelihood that simple spot arrangements govern transactions by about 30% for long hauls. I find weaker
evidence of relationships between local market thickness and contractual form for short hauls -- hauls for
which quasi-rents are particularly small. Contracts’ role as protectors of quasi-rents becomes less important
as quasi-rents decrease, but exists over a surprisingly large range.
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1. Introduction
A central proposition of hold-up-based theories (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978),
Williamson (1979, 1985); see also Grossman and Hart (1985)) is that firms will substitute more
complicated contractual arrangements for simple spot arrangements when transactions involve
relationship-specific investments.  Early work found evidence in favor of this proposition in several
procurement contexts, including auto parts (Monteverde and Teece (1982)), aerospace components
(Masten (1984)), natural gas (Masten and Crocker (1985)), and coal (Joskow (1985, 1987)).
Investments in these contexts are generally large and sunk over long horizons.  Appropriable quasi-
rents tend to be correspondingly large when these investments are also relationship-specific.  This
literature established that hold-up-based theories can have predictive content.  But it says less about
the theories’ scope because it examines contexts in which the theories are most likely to hold.
1  
This paper examines these theories’ scope.  The issue of scope is important because most
transactions do not involve assets which are as relationship-specific as those examined in the
previous literature.  Specificity instead arises for more mundane reasons such as search or
transportation costs, or temporal mismatches between supply and demand (Masten, Meehan, and
Snyder (1991)).  Quasi-rents arise in search (Diamond (1971)) and switching cost (Klemperer
(1987)) models in much the same way as in hold-up-based theories.  In all of these models, agents’
actions can transform competitive situations to monopolistic or monopsonistic ones.
   How far do the contractual implications of hold-up-based theories extend?  How large and
long-lasting must quasi-rents be for firms to mitigate incentive conflicts with formal contractual
arrangements?
   I investigate these issues in the context of trucking.  Trucking is an interesting context for
such an investigation because assets are rarely specific to users over long horizons.  Assets are less
specific than in most situations previously examined by the empirical literature.  Quasi-rents are
smaller and only exist in the short- and medium-run.  Quasi-rents arise for two reasons relevant to
this paper.  First, trucks and trailers can be specific to users in the very short run.   When trucks
arrive to pick up goods, quasi-rents arise because it is costly for carriers to redeploy them to serve2This can, of course, be a two-sided problem: carriers can hold up shippers as well.  The
analysis from shippers’ perspective is analogous.
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other customers.
2  These quasi-rents are generally small because trucks and trailers are very mobile,
but would vary with the thickness of the local market.  Second, in long haul markets, efficient entry
involves route-specific investments which lower carriers’ cost of filling “backhauls,” or return trips.
These investments help carriers market service to shippers with demands which complement those
of outbound shippers.  I will refer to the information garnered by such investments as “route-specific
knowledge.”  These investments are relationship-specific when shipping lanes are thin.
Appropriable quasi-rents arise when alternative shippers demanding service on the same outbound
route are scarce.  These quasi-rents appear over longer horizons than those arising from tractor-
trailers’ specificity because it is less costly to find an alternative shipper in general than one for a
specific route.  But they are smaller and appear over shorter horizons than in the circumstances
studied in most of the early empirical literature.  Hold-up-based theories predict that, absent
alternative institutional responses, simple spot arrangements will be used less relative to more
sophisticated contractual forms when local markets are thin for both short and long hauls.
The empirical work uses data from over 30,000 trucks from the Census’ 1992 Truck
Inventory and Use Survey.  I test for relationships between local market thickness and contractual
form separately for hauls of different distances.  If they exist for both short and long hauls, this
implies that firms use formal contractual arrangements to ameliorate contractual problems arising
from tractor-trailers’ specificity.  If they exist for long hauls but not short hauls, this indicates that
they do so in response to appropriation problems related to investments in route-specific knowledge,
but not tractor-trailers’ specificity.  If they appear for neither class of hauls, this implies that firms
do not use contractual form to mitigate either of the problems described above.  These tests have
general implications regarding the scope of hold-up-based theories.  Relationships between local
market conditions and contractual form for long hauls indicate that the contractual implications of
these theories apply beyond situations where asset specificity extends over long horizons.  If such
relationships exist for short hauls as well, this is evidence that these implications are extremely
broad.
The main empirical results follow.  For long hauls, long-term contracts are used more relative3They are also complementary to Nickerson and Silverman (1996), who find that
relationship-specific investments affect contractual relationships between carriers and drivers. 
See Palay (1984) for specificity and governance in rail shipping.
4The thickest local market Pirrong examines is grain shipments originating on the lower
Mississippi River.  On average, about 10 ships/day load grain in this market.  This is thinner than
nearly all trucking markets covering regions of comparable size.  For example, the Census’ Truck
Inventory and Use Survey estimates that 20-60 trucks based in each of South Dakota, Kansas,
and Nebraska – states not noted for forestry – haul goods using logging trailers.
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to simple spot arrangements when local outbound markets are thin, especially when inbound markets
are thin as well.  Contractual form for these hauls varies with shipping markets’ composition and
size.  The magnitudes of these relationships are economically significant.  For example, consider
hauls which use a particular type of trailer.  Doubling the trailer’s share within a region increases the
fraction of hauls which are governed by spot arrangements by about 30%.  These relationships
appear across most trailer types, even those which are not specific to product classes such as basic,
enclosed vans.  For short hauls, I find relationships between contractual form and market size, but
not between contractual form and market composition.  These results provide evidence that problems
associated with appropriating the value of investments in route-specific knowledge drive contracting
decisions.  There is less evidence that problems associated with tractor-trailers’ specificity to users
in the very short run drives these decisions.  I conclude that the contractual implications of hold-up-
based theories extend beyond circumstances where specific investments are large and sunk.  There
is some evidence that these implications extend to circumstances where quasi-rents are small and
appear only in the very short run, but this evidence is weaker.
These results reinforce and extend the existing literature in several ways.  In particular, they
expand upon Pirrong’s (1993) study, which provides qualitative evidence that contractual form
varies with market thickness in the context of ocean shipping.
3  First, they indicate that hold-up-
based theories’ scope extends even beyond Pirrong’s context; trucking markets are generally thicker
than the thickest ocean shipping markets.
4  Second, they suggest a bound to these theories’ predictive
scope.  Differences in the composition of local markets do not explain differences in contractual
form when markets are as thick as those in local trucking. Third, they are quantitative rather than
qualitative.  To my knowledge, this paper is the first to quantify relationships between market5Throughout this paper, “shippers” refers to firms or divisions demanding transportation
services (e.g. manufacturing divisions) and “carriers” refers to those supplying such services. 
When firms choose to haul their own goods, “shippers” and “carriers” are divisions of the same
firm.
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thickness and contractual form.
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 characterizes the contractual forms
used in trucking, describes how appropriable quasi-rents arise within motor carriage transactions,
and develops the hypotheses to be tested.  Section 3 presents the data, proposes measures of local
market conditions, and depicts general relationships between contractual form and these measures.
Section 4 contains the estimation results and the results and implications of the hypothesis tests.  It
also investigates the alternative hypothesis that relationships between contractual form and local
market conditions reflect competition from rail and other substitute shipping modes rather than
contractual issues.  Section 5 concludes.
2.  Contractual Form and Asset Specificity in Trucking
Shippers and carriers make a series of long-, medium-, and short-run decisions that determine
output and the terms of trade.
5  Shippers’ long-run decisions include entry into product markets and
any large, sunk capital investments such as manufacturing plants.  Similarly, carriers’ long-run
decisions include terminals and other infrastructural investments.  Shippers and carriers make
medium-run decisions taking these as given.  Medium-run decisions are made over horizons of
roughly six months to one year.  These include how much route-specific knowledge to acquire.  They
also include equipment purchases and any long-term contractual arrangements.  Equipment
purchases determine the size and composition of firms’ owned tractor-trailer fleets.  Contractual
arrangements include those between shippers and for-hire carriers, and between firms and equipment
leasing companies.  These medium-run decisions are based on demand forecasts and anticipate that
short-run production-related decisions will be profit-maximizing.  Shippers’ demand for motor
carriage reflects trade patterns with their customers.  In most cases, this demand is consistent and
periodic.
Firms’ medium-run decisions determine shipping transactions’ contractual form.  In this
paper, contractual form means whether shippers haul their own goods, and whether transactions with6For example, the Uniform Straight Bill of Lading put forth by the American Trucking
Associations states: “Unless arranged or agreed upon, in writing, prior to shipment, carrier is not
bound to transport a shipment by a particular schedule or in time for a particular market, but is
responsible to transport with reasonable dispatch.”
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for-hire carriers are mediated by formal long-term contracts or a series of simple spot arrangements.
When individual firms either ship multiple products or ship products over various distances, different
contractual forms may be used for each product-distance combination.  Although shippers and
carriers seek to maximize profits individually, it is in their mutual interest to choose efficient
contractual forms, where efficiency reflects both production and transaction costs.
Three contractual forms mediate trade between shippers and carriers: private carriage,
contract carriage, and common carriage.  These correspond to situations where the terms of trade
take the form of vertical integration, long-term contracts, and spot arrangements.  Distinctions among
these forms follow distinctions laws and regulations made among firms when the industry was
heavily regulated (roughly, between 1935 and 1980).  Private carriage is when shippers haul their
own goods using internal dispatching systems and employee drivers.  The terms of trade in contract
and common carriage differ both in the length of the agreement and its specificity to shipper-carrier
combinations.
Bills of lading contain the terms of trade under common carriage. These documents cover
individual shipments.  They are standard forms which contain the names of the shipper and carrier,
the origin and destination, the volume, the type of commodity, the price (or “rate”), whether the
shipment is prepaid or collect, and any equipment or handling requirements (such as for refrigerated
or fragile goods).  The incentive provisions in bills of lading are not specific to hauls, carriers, or
shippers.   For example, bills of lading almost always contain standard provisions describing the
extent of carriers’ liability, but generally do not have provisions which specify delivery windows or
penalties for late arrivals.
6  A distinguishing characteristic of common carriage is that there are no
formal incentive provisions that are specific to the transactional relationship.
ICC regulations covered common carriage rates during the period under study, but these
regulations had little effect on shipping markets because the ICC had little interest in forcing firms
to abide by their spirit. Between 1983 and 1994, regulations required carriers to file common carriage7Even the simplest contracts require the services of a transportation lawyer.
8Braunschweig, Crum, and Allen (1995) report survey results which indicate that
minimum volume, service quality, and dedicated service provisions are common elements of
motor freight contracts. 
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rates that were non-discriminatory and required a five-day advance notice for most increases.
However, in practice, the term “common carriage” was a misnomer: common carriage rates were
negotiated prices which could effectively be changed in the very short run. Carriers could
discriminate among shippers by defining the circumstances in which common carriage rates applied
very narrowly (for example, between two street addresses).  Filed rates usually exceeded market
prices by a considerable amount.  Carriers and shippers negotiated discounts which then could be
renegotiated in the very short run. 
Motor carrier contracts contain the terms of trade under contract carriage.  These always
cover multiple hauls.  They can be costly to construct even absent substantial disagreements because
they are legal documents which contain provisions specific to carrier-shipper pairs.
7  A s  a
consequence, they usually cover hauls over reasonably long periods: six months to two years.  Prices
are usually stipulated in terms of rate formulas which are based on mileage and sometimes fuel
prices.  Contracts often contain take-or-pay provisions that guarantee carriers minimum freight
volumes.  Such provisions, combined with renegotiation costs, may limit bargaining during the
period contracts cover.  Contracts also usually contain more detailed incentive provisions than bills
of lading.  For example, many specify service requirements; these can include delivery windows and
the penalties which apply when shipments are late.  Many also contain provisions which restrict
carriers’ ability to use equipment to serve other shippers.  Such provisions serve to “dedicate” part
of carriers’ fleets to individual shippers.
8   Unlike common carriage agreements, motor carriage
contracts contain formal incentive provisions that can be enforced by third parties.  Although
minimum purchase guarantees and exclusivity clauses can serve multiple purposes, one purpose can
be to protect against quasi-rent appropriation.  Using formal contracts provides firms more legal
recourse than relying only on informal self-enforcing arrangements.
Asset Specificity in Trucking
Several well-known theories describe how relying on simple spot arrangements to mediate7
trade can be inefficient when transactions involve the use of specific assets.  As emphasized by
Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978), assets’ specificity to individual users creates quasi-rents which
are potentially appropriable by one or more parties.  Quasi-rents’ appropriability can lead to
inefficiencies which appear in several forms, including underinvestment in specific assets, the
expenditure of resources toward enhancing bargaining positions, and low levels of trade.  Klein,
Crawford and Alchian (1978), Williamson (1979, 1985), and others argue that buyers and sellers
may substitute more sophisticated contractual relationships for simple spot arrangements when
transactions involve relationship-specific investments.  Contracts or, in more extreme cases, vertical
integration may mitigate the inefficiencies that would arise if trade were mediated instead by a series
of simple spot arrangements.
In trucking, appropriable quasi-rents can arise in two ways relevant to this study.  One way
is that trucks and trailers can be specific to individual shippers in the very short run.  The logic is
simple, and is closely related to that described in Pirrong (1993) in the context of ocean shipping.
When a truck pulls up to a loading dock, quasi-rents are created which are potentially appropriable.
At that point, it is costly for the carrier to use the truck to serve another shipper.  It must identify an
alternative customer and incur time and transportation costs to move the truck to a new loading dock.
Moreover, it may be costly for the shipper to be served by another carrier, also because of search and
time costs.   These quasi-rents would generally be small, but would vary systematically with the
thickness of local shipping markets.  In markets where few local shippers demand service which uses
a particular type of trailer, carriers may have to wait longer, travel greater distances, or attach a
different trailer to use a truck-tractor to serve alternative shippers.
The other way appropriable quasi-rents can arise is relevant for long hauls but not short hauls.
Long-haul markets differ from short-haul markets because of the importance of lining up backhauls.
Shippers and carriers are imperfectly informed about short run supply and demand on individual
routes in the very short run.  Unlike, for example, stock exchanges, markets are decentralized.
Route-specific investments can enable carriers to obtain better matches to their outbound hauls.
This, in turn, lowers the effective cost of outbound hauls.  For example, if carriers can identify
shippers which frequently ship goods in the opposite direction and coordinate schedules, they can
utilize capacity at a higher rate.  Route-specific investments are relationship-specific when city-pair8
markets are thin.  If carriers cannot easily find and serve other shippers with similar demands, part
of the value of these investments depends on serving specific shippers.  Appropriable quasi-rents,
and associated bargaining problems, arise.
Interstate trucking deregulation removed regulatory barriers which had prevented carriers
from entering city-pair markets.  Most carriers that offer local service in a given area are potential
entrants into long-haul markets originating from the same area.  In this sense, long-haul markets are
as competitive as short-haul ones.  Efficient entry into long-haul markets generally requires sunk
route-specific investments, however.  Ex ante competitive situations thus can become ex post
monopolistic ones when outbound shipping lanes are thin.
Empirical Tests and Alternative Hypotheses
The source and magnitude of appropriable quasi-rents thus vary for hauls of different lengths.
Therefore, testing for relationships between local market conditions and contractual form separately
for hauls of different distances provides information regarding which appropriation problems firms
address with formal contracts.  The results of these tests are generally  important because they carry
implications for hold-up-based theories’ scope.
 I first test for relationships between contractual form and local market conditions for short
hauls.  If such relationships exist, this implies that firms use contractual form to mitigate
appropriation problems arising from tractor-trailers’ specificity to users in the very short run.  If such
relationships do not exist, this implies either that appropriation problems do not exist or they are
mitigated in ways that do not involve formal contracts -- for example, reputation-based incentive
mechanisms suffice. 
 I then test for relationships between contractual form and market conditions for hauls of
longer distances.  If they exist for long hauls but not short ones, this implies that firms use contracts
to address appropriation problems associated with route-specific knowledge.  Contractual form does
reflect problems associated with quasi-rent appropriation, but only those in which assets are specific
beyond the very short run.  One would then conclude that hold-up-based theories’ contractual
implications are quite broad -- the quasi-rents associated with route-specific knowledge are probably
smaller than those which arise with respect to the large, sunk investments studied in other contexts --
but not so wide as to cover circumstances where quasi-rents are small and appear only in the very9See Keeler (1989) for scale economies in trucking.  One explanation for specialists’
competitive advantage relies on “coordination economies” similar to those in Bagwell and
Ramey (1994).  Shippers uncertain about which carriers serve which routes economize by calling
for-hire carriers first.
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short run.  Finding that relationships exist for neither short nor long hauls implies that firms do not
use formal arrangements to mitigate either of the appropriation problems described above.  Such a
result would provide evidence against the idea that the contractual implications of hold-up-based
theories generally extend to situations where investments are neither large nor relationship-specific
over long horizons.
Relationships between contractual form and local market conditions may arise for
production-cost-related reasons as well as quasi-rent-related reasons.  Some empirical relationships
which may reflect appropriation problems may reflect other phenomena as well.  For example,
contractual form is affected by the volume of goods shippers ship.  Trucking specialists generally
have a comparative advantage over non-trucking-specialists in achieving scale economies because
they can aggregate demands of different shippers at lower cost.
9  This comparative advantage is
smallest when shippers ship large volumes.  The choice between contract and common carriage may
also be related to shipping volumes. Contract carriage is less advantageous when shippers ship small
volumes because of the fixed cost of constructing contracts.  This is an issue because shipping
volumes are not observed in the data, and may differ systematically across trailer types.  Specialized
trailers such as grain bodies or logging trailers tend to haul goods for which shipment volumes are
high.  Relationships between trailers’ physical characteristics and contractual form may reflect this
as well as appropriation problems.
As a consequence, the primary economic inferences are based on relationships between local
market conditions and contractual form, conditional on trailers’ physical characteristics.  Tests
compare, for example, contractual form for hauls using logging trailers in regions where there are
few local users versus many (for instance, Kansas versus Oregon).  A maintained assumption
throughout is that the volume individual shippers ship does not systematically differ with local
market conditions.  This may not strictly hold, but if high-volume shippers tend to be located in thick
local markets, shipping volumes’ effect on contractual form would work in the opposite direction10The bias works in the wrong direction if, for example, plant size is systematically higher
in thin local markets than in thick ones.
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from contractual difficulties’ effect.  The former would lead to more private and contract carriage
in thicker markets.  Finding that the opposite is true suggests the interpretation that problems
associated with quasi-rent appropriation affect contractual form.
10
A second, related issue is that trucking specialists’ production-cost-related advantage is likely
to differ with local market conditions.  This advantage is due to their ability to aggregate different
shippers’ demands.  It is small when local markets are thin.  Relationships between local market
thickness and the margin between internal and external procurement may not reflect responses to
contractual problems, but rather the familiar principle that specialization is limited by the size of the
market. Sterner tests of whether concerns about quasi-rent appropriation affect contractual form are
based on relationships between local market conditions and contractual form, given external
procurement.  One would not expect trucking specialists’ comparative advantage in production to
affect the choice between common and contract carriage, since the relevant margin is between two
forms of external procurement.  This will be a maintained assumption when interpreting the
empirical results.  Although the empirical work reports relationships between local market conditions
and contractual form in general, the main economic inferences are based on the estimates which
explain the margin between common and contract carriage -- in particular, relationships between
local market thickness and this margin.
A third issue is whether it is possible to distinguish hypotheses in which contractual
arrangements mitigate problems arising from opportunistic behavior from hypotheses in which
arrangements merely coordinate supply.  An example of the latter is the following.  Suppose shippers
anticipate that they will demand service at some point in the future, but are uncertain whether supply
will exist at that point – perhaps because all capacity in the market is in use.  They then would have
incentives to make arrangements with carriers to ensure supply, particularly when markets are thin.
Forward contracts can arise even when parties are unconcerned about opportunistic behavior.  If
coordination of this sort requires formal, legally-enforceable agreements, the empirical work cannot
distinguish between opportunism- and coordination-based theories.
But it is not clear why firms would bear the additional cost of formalizing agreements absent11The latter excludes trucks which are used to transport trailers which have cranes or large
winches permanently attached.
12The Survey oversamples trucks registered in less-populous states.  All of the analysis in
this paper uses the weights provided by the Census to adjust for oversampling.  See Bureau of the
Census (1995) and Hubbard (1998) for more details regarding the data.
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concerns about contractual fulfillment.  Absent such concerns, shippers could ensure supply by
simply contacting carriers and asking them to reserve capacity.  The value of formalizing
arrangements in a legally-enforceable document is clearer when their purpose is to mitigate incentive
conflicts: shippers and carriers have more recourse should their trading partner renege.  Because the
empirical tests are based on a margin that distinguishes between contractual forms in which incentive
provisions are informal and formal, I will interpret the results using theories in which contracts
address incentive conflicts.
3. Data
The data are from the 1992 Truck Inventory and Use Survey (TIUS).  The TIUS is a mail-out
survey taken by the Bureau of the Census as part of the Census of Transportation.  The Census sends
survey forms to a random sample of truck owners.  The survey asks questions about trucks’
characteristics: for example, their type (e.g., pick-up, truck-tractor), make, model, and after-market
equipment.  It also asks questions about how trucks are used.  These questions obtain variables
which indicate how far trucks operated from their base, the class of trailer to which they were
commonly attached, and the product class they generally hauled.  The survey also asks whether
trucks were part of private or for-hire fleets.  If trucks were for-hire, it asks whether they operated
primarily under common or contract carriage.  This paper uses only observations of truck-tractors
– the front halves of tractor-trailer combinations – and excludes truck-tractors that are: used
primarily for personal transportation, rented out by the day, used to haul waste, or not used to haul
goods.
11  It also excludes the small fraction of trucks used mainly for “exempt” carriage: interstate
hauls to which ICC regulation traditionally did not apply.  The data do not indicate contractual form
for such trucks.  The final sample includes 32,015 trucks.
1213Because observations of trucks rather than hauls and the calculations do not adjust for
differences and changes in intensity of use, the shares in table 1 indicate capacity shares rather
than output shares.
14Only about 4.7% of land in the U.S. is developed.  This ranges from over 30% in New
Jersey to less than 1% in Wyoming, Nevada, and Alaska.  Alaska and Hawaii are excluded from
the analysis.
12
TDjk ' number of state k trucks with trailer j as their principal trailer
developed area of state k
Table 1 shows basic patterns in contractual form during 1992.
13  Trucks are classified
according to whether they are used primarily for common, contract, or private carriage.  Overall,
about 55% are used for private carriage.  Slightly over half of the rest are used to haul goods under
common carriage agreements.    The table breaks out these shares according to the type of trailer to
which trucks are normally attached.  “Specialized vans” includes insulated, non-refrigerated vans,
drop frame (side-loading) vans, and open-top vans.  “Specialized trailers” includes all trailer types
not otherwise classified; grain bodies, livestock trailers, and logging trailers are the most common
in this category.  There is a general correspondence between contractual form and trailers’ specificity
to uses.  Trucks commonly attached to basic vans tend to operate under common carriage more than
trucks attached to most other trailers.   Correspondingly, trucks attached to specialized trailers tend
to operate under private carriage.  
Trailer Type, Local Market Conditions, and Contractual Form
I now introduce the variables used to proxy for cross-sectional differences in local market
conditions.  One of these is “trailer density.”  The formula is:
I calculate the numerator from the individual observations in the TIUS and the sampling weights
provided by the Census.  Trucks’ state corresponds to where they are based, not where they are
registered or the headquarters of the firm that owns them.  The denominator is computed using data
summarized in the 1998 Statistical Abstract of the United States (Bureau of the Census (1998)) from
the Department of Agriculture’s National Resources Inventory.  “Developed area” includes urban
and built-up areas of 10 acres or more, and is measured in square miles.
14  Trailer density captures15To see this, compare two states.  Suppose that they have identical economies except that
in one, all activity is within a single city, but in the other, it is evenly divided into two equally-
sized cities, one hundred miles apart.  TD and TA would be the same in both states, but market












both the composition and density of state k’s fleet – i.e., state k’s trailer and truck capacity
normalized by a measure of geographic area.  Because capacity measures reflect aggregate demand,
trailer density (and other measures of local market conditions) have demand- as well as supply-side
interpretations.  The composition of the fleet reflects the composition of shipping demand.  Likewise,
fleet density reflects the density of shippers.
One can break trailer density down into components that reflect composition and density:
TSjk is “trailer share”: the fraction of state k’s fleet which is principally attached to trailer type j.  TAk
is trucks/area for state k.  Note that ln(TDjk) = ln(TSjk) + ln(TAk).  Including ln(TD) in a model to
capture differences in market thickness is identical to including both ln(TS) and ln(TA) and
restricting their coefficients to be the same.  One can test this restriction by including ln(TS) and
ln(TA) separately and testing the equality of the coefficients.  Finding differences implies that the
composition and general density of the market (as measured) affect contractual form differently.
These measures are not perfect.  Ideally, one would base measures on narrower definitions
that capture market thickness better.  For example, these measures do not capture differences in local
market conditions within states.  Thus, empirical work which identifies parameters using regional
differences is limited to doing so using cross-state differences.  In addition, TD and TA may capture
“average” cross-state differences in local markets poorly, because they do not account for cross-state
differences in the agglomeration of shipping markets (and economic activity in general).
Normalizing by developed area makes markets in states where developed area is dispersed (such as
Iowa) look thick relative to those where it is agglomerated (such as Nevada).
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Measurement error thus may bias estimates of coefficients on ln(TD) and ln(TA).  One can
check whether this is the case by replacing ln(TA) with state fixed effects (or, equivalently, including14
fixed effects with ln(TD)).  This allows one to estimate relationships between market composition
and contractual form even if regional differences in density and size are not captured well by TD and
TA.  In the results section, I report and interpret coefficients on ln(TD) and ln(TA).  Concerns about
measurement error mean that these provide weaker evidence than coefficients which indicate
relationships between contractual form and measures of market composition.
A second issue related to these proxies is that they reflect where trucks are based, not
necessarily where they haul.  Long-haul shipping markets are based on origin-destination pairs.
Ideally, measures of market thickness should be based on the density of individual shipping lanes,
not characteristics of one of the endpoints.  The proposed proxies work well for long hauls if the
density of shipping lanes emanating from a state is highly correlated with characteristics of its
trucking fleet.  There is reason to believe that this condition holds.  For example, one would expect
the density of long-haul shipping lanes involving states with large trucking fleets relative to their area
to be high (higher in shipping lanes involving New Jersey those involving New Mexico) and to be
related to fleets’ composition (higher for hauls using logging trailers in Oregon than in Kansas).
  Tables 2-4 depict relationships between contractual form and both TA and TS during 1992.
Table 2 reports private and common carriage shares for the bottom and top five states ranked by
trucks/developed area.  Trucks/developed area is highest in states where economic activity is most
concentrated in large cities.  Contractual form shares vary considerably among the states classified
as “bottom five” and “top five.” The private carriage share tends to be lower and the common
carriage share tends to be higher for the “top five” than the “bottom five.”  Shorter-term contractual
arrangements are more prevalent in states with dense markets.  Internal procurement is less
prevalent.
Table 3 summarizes within-state trailer shares.  Averaging across states, the mean share of
basic vans is 29.2%.  The mean share is lower for hauls using more specialized equipment,
particularly for those grouped in “specialized vans” and “specialized trailers.”  For each trailer type,
trailer shares vary considerably across states; this variation is important for identifying relationships
between local market conditions and contractual form.  Variation is particularly large for the most
common trailer types.  For example, basic vans’ share ranges from 6.7% in Wyoming to 54.4% in
Tennessee.  The states in which the share of the “specialized trailers” is highest are regions from16“Product classes” are those in Hubbard (1998).  They are broadly defined: for example,
“processed food,” “building materials,” “transportation equipment.”
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which shipments of autos, grain, livestock, and logs tend to originate.   Trailer shares reflect cross-
sectional differences in what is shipped from each state.  The right two columns show the class of
products most commonly shipped on each trailer type, and a Herfindahl-like measure of trailers’
specificity to product classes.  The latter is constructed as follows.  I classify the trucks according
to trailer type.  Within each class, I then calculate the fraction that are used primarily to transport
each product class in the data.  Call this fraction sij, where i indexes the trailer type and j indexes the
product class.






This rough measure confirms the intuition that basic vans and platforms are least specific to product
classes, and that auto trailers and “specialized trailers” are the most specific.
Table 4 shows the fraction of trucks operating under private and common carriage, by trailer
type.  The left column of each panel reports these fractions calculated across the entire sample.  The
right column contains analogous proportions calculated across only the three states for which trailer
shares are highest for each trailer type.  Comparing the two columns in the left panel, common
carriage has a higher average share for the “top three states” than the sample mean for all trailer types
except platforms.  This suggests that contractual form, given outside procurement, is influenced by
the composition of the local fleet.  In the right panel, private carriage has a much smaller than
average share for the “top three states” than the sample mean for all of the vans and tank trucks
except drop frame vans.  The make-or-buy decision varies with market composition for hauls using
these trailers.  Similar differences do not appear for the specialized trailers.
Cross-tabulations indicate that relationships exist between contractual form and local market
conditions.  The following section explores these relationships further.  I first test the hypotheses
outlined in the previous section.  I then investigate whether relationships between local market
conditions and contractual form arise for reasons having to do with selection.  Finally, I test whether
relationships between local market conditions and contractual form are strongest in states with the
thinnest backhaul markets.
4.  Results
Tables 5-7 contain results from ordered logit specifications.  The dependent variable is equal16
to zero, one, and two if the truck is used primarily for common, contract, and private carriage,
respectively.  The “primary use” criterion employed by the Census means that for medium- and long-
haul trucks, the dependent variable corresponds to the contractual form primarily used for outbound
hauls.








P(contract) ' 1 & P(common) & P(private)
where X includes a constant.   1 and  2 are coefficients which estimate relationships between the
variables in X and the common/contract and contract/private margins, respectively.  Positive
estimates of these coefficients identify variables associated with longer-term arrangements.  This
specification differs slightly from most ordered models because I allow the explanatory variables to
affect the two margins differently.
Table 5 summarizes results from basic specifications.  The three panels use samples of trucks
which primarily operate within 50 miles, between 50 and 200 miles, and over 200 miles from their
base.  In these specifications, X includes a constant, a vector of dummy variables indicating the
trailer type to which the truck was generally attached, a “mixed cargo” dummy that equals one if the
truck generally carried cargo from multiple product classes and zero otherwise, and ln(trailer
density).  The mixed cargo dummy is an indicator for trucks used for “less-than-truckload” hauls.
These hauls are generally governed by short- term arrangements due to lower shipping volumes and
efficiencies of consolidation.  The coefficients of interest in these specifications are those on
ln(trailer density), particularly those explaining the margin between common and contract carriage.
The main result from these specifications is that simple spot arrangements are used more
when markets are thick, especially for longer hauls.  The coefficient on ln(trailer density) at the
common/contract margin is negative and significant for each of the distance categories.  Spot
arrangements are used less when trailer density is low.  The short-haul coefficient suggests that
tractor-trailers’ specificity in the very short run affects contractual form.  The fact that the medium-17
and long-haul coefficients are larger suggests that specificity arising from route-specific knowledge
affects contractual form.  These results imply that the contractual implications of hold-up-based
theories extend well beyond circumstances where investments are large and relationship-specific
over long horizons.
Table 6 reports probability derivatives for ln(trailer density).  These indicate predicted
changes in contractual form from doubling trailer density, which corresponds roughly to moving
from the 25
th to the 50
th, or the 50
th to the 75
th percentile values.  Holding all explanatory variables
at their sample means, an interquartile change in trailer density increases the common carriage share
for long hauls by 8.6 percentage points, or 28.1%.  It increases the common carriage share for
medium hauls by 5.2 percentage points, or 32.6%, and for short hauls by 2.5 percentage points, or
21.5%.  The empirical relationships between market thickness and contractual form thus are not only
statistically significant, but economically important.
Other patterns in table 5 may reflect problems associated with quasi-rent appropriation, but
have other interpretations as well.  In particular, the ln(trailer density) coefficients on the
contract/private margin are all negative and significant, and are higher in absolute value for longer
hauls.  Shippers haul their own goods more when local markets are thin.  This may indicate the same
phenomena as at the common/contract margin, but may also reflect that for-hire carriers cannot
achieve scale economies in thin markets (“specialization is limited by the size of the market”).
Table 7 contains results from more detailed specifications which further explore relationships
between local market conditions and contractual form.  These specifications indicate that the factors
which identify the results in table 5 for short hauls are different than those which do so for long
hauls.  The results in table 7 provide weaker evidence that relationships between trailer density and
the common/contract margin for short hauls are due to contracting problems.
The results in the left columns are from specifications which allow relationships between
trailer density and contractual form to differ across trailer types.  Whereas the coefficients on trailer
density in table 5 exploit differences across trailer types and geographic regions, the coefficients on
the interactions exploit only geographic differences.  I report only the interaction coefficients here;
the specification includes the same control variables as above.  Considering the common/contract
margin for short hauls, only three of the interaction coefficients are negative and statistically18
significant.   In contrast, almost all of the interactions are negative and statistically significant for
medium and long hauls.  Relationships between trailer density and spot contracting persist across
a wide range of trailers for medium and long hauls, but not for short hauls.
The middle columns break ln(trailer density) into components which reflect differences in
the size and composition of local markets: ln(trailer share) and ln(trucks/area).  The coefficient on
ln(trucks/area) is negative and statistically significant for each distance category; the coefficient on
ln(trailer share) is significant for long and medium hauls.  If market thickness for particular trailer
types affects quasi-rents’ appropriability, then the composition of local markets, conditional on their
size, should affect contractual form.  Figures 1 and 2 depict the relationship between ln(trailer share)
and contractual form for short and long hauls, respectively.  Predicted contractual form shares,
holding all variables other than trailer share at their sample means, are on the horizontal axis.  Trailer
share is on the vertical axis.  Figure 1 shows that there is little relationship between trailer share and
contractual form for short hauls; the lines depicting the two margins are close to vertical.  In contrast,
figure 2 shows that the relationship between local market composition and contractual form is strong
for long hauls.  Moving from a 0.05 share to a 0.10 share increases the probability that hauls are
mediated by common carriage arrangements from 0.20 to 0.26, or 32%.  These specifications
indicate that market composition and size drive relationships between ln(trailer density) and
contractual form at the common/contract margin for medium and long hauls.  However, there is only
weak evidence that market composition and contractual form are related for short hauls.  
The right columns of table 7 report estimates from specifications which replace
ln(trucks/area) with fixed effects for each state.  I report the coefficients on ln(trailer share).  By
construction, the coefficients on ln(trailer share) are the same as one would get if one included
ln(trailer density) instead.  The relationship between local market conditions and contractual form
is strong for long and medium hauls.  Moving from a 0.05 share to a 0.10 share increases the
probability that medium and long hauls are mediated by common carriage agreements by 20-25%.
I find no relationship between local market conditions and contractual form for short hauls.  The
statistically significant coefficients reported in table 5 reflect only relationships between contractual
form and the general density of states’ trucking fleets.
Intermodal Selection Issues19
Figures 1 and 2 raise the question of whether relationships between local market conditions
and contractual form are driven by selection.  The empirical analysis is conditional on firms choosing
to ship by truck.  Rail can be a close substitute for trucks for long distance shipping, particularly for
goods which are shipped in bulk such as coal, minerals, grain, lumber, and metals.  Suppose rail is
characterized by large scale economies, and cross-price elasticities between truck and rail are high.
Then, looking across local markets, rail’s share may be negatively correlated with trailer share.  For
example, one might observe high rail share and low dump trailer share in regions where mining is
important.  Despite the fact that the shipping market is thick for products hauled by dump trailers,
dump trailers’ share of long hauls would be small because the market is large enough to allow scale
economies to be achieved in rail.  If rail is a closer substitute to common carriage than to contract
or private carriage, selection would create relationships between trailer share and contractual form
similar to those in figure 2.
I investigate this in two ways.  First, I examine whether trailer share is low where production
of products typically hauled by the trailer is high.   From table 3, dump trailers’ share is very high
in Nevada and West Virginia: states that produce the most metallic ores and coal, respectively.  It
is also high in other major mining states such as Arizona and Kentucky.  Similar patterns appear for
specialized trailers’ shares: grain bodies’ share is highest in the major grain-producing states, for
example.  Trailer share is high, not low, in regions where production of products that are hauled by
these trailers is high.
Second, I explore whether trailer share tends to be low in regions where rail share is high.
I test for relationships between rail share and trailer share for two product classes which are almost
exclusively hauled on platform trailers: lumber and primary metals.  The latter includes goods such
as pipes, ingots, and sheet metal.  The rail share for long (over 250 miles) hauls of these goods is
sizeable, but not extremely large: between 25-30%.  Using data from the Census’ 1993 Commodity
Flow Survey, I compute rail and truck shares for each of these product classes at the state level.
Although the level of disaggregation does not allow one to compute these shares for long hauls only,
the data contain “average haul distance” at the state*product class level.  I use this to control for
cross-state differences in haul length.  It is not possible to compute rail and truck shares for lumber
and primary metals in each  state.  The Census does not publish quantities when they are not deemed17This sort of cross-sectional test is only possible at all for goods such as lumber or metal
that are shipped from many different states.  One cannot run similar tests for other products  such
as coal or ores because few states ship these products in large quantities.
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statistically reliable or when they would violate confidentiality restrictions.  The empirical analysis
includes only states for which there are non-missing values for each variable.  It thus generally
excludes states which ship small quantities of lumber and primary metals.
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I regress rail share and (1-truck share) on platform trailer share and average haul distance.
(1-truck share) is a measure of all substitutes for truck hauling, which in this case mostly includes
barges as well as rail.  Platform trailer share is calculated across all trucks within each state.  In
specifications not reported here, I use an analogous measure calculated across only long haul trucks;
the results do not qualitatively differ.  Results are in table 8.  The first panel examines lumber
shipping.  The coefficient on trailer share is positive in both specifications, and is significant in the
second.  States where the trucking fleet is disproportionately platform trailers are those in which
shipping modes other than trucks have high shares for lumber hauls.  The results are stronger in the
second specification because the variance in the dependent variable is larger: the degree to which
lumber is shipped via water differs considerably across states.  The trailer share coefficient is not
significantly different from zero in the primary metal specifications.  The third panel constructs  rail
share and (1-truck share) from the sum of lumber and primary metal shipments.  The results are
similar to those in the lumber specification, mainly because lumber shipments are just under three
times primary metal shipments.  These results provide no evidence of a negative relationship
between trailer share and the share of non-truck shipping modes.
Combined, these results do not suggest that shipping mode selection is driving the results in
the previous subsection.  If anything, selection would work against finding positive relationships
between spot contracting and market thickness.
Outbound/Inbound Ratios
I next explore the hypothesis that relationships between local market thickness and
contractual form are due to specific investments which are backhaul-related.  Under this hypothesis,
one would expect such relationships to be strongest when backhaul markets are thin, because the
investments required to identify and serve backhaul customers would tend to be larger.21
I test whether relationships between the contractual form used for outbound hauls and local
market conditions differ across states along with the ratio of interstate outbound and inbound truck
shipments.   Backhaul markets tend to be thinner, the higher the outbound/inbound ratio.  Using data
from the 1993 Commodity Flow Survey, I calculate the volume of outbound and inbound interstate
truck shipments for each state.  The ratio between these quantities varies considerably, ranging from
about 0.5 for Nevada, Delaware, and Massachusetts to about 2.0 for Wyoming, Maine, and Montana.
Finding that the relationship between local market thickness and contractual form is strongest for
hauls which originate in markets where the outbound/inbound ratio is high is consistent with the
hypothesis that relationships between local market conditions and the common/contract margin for
medium and long hauls are due to backhaul-related route-specific investments.
The results in table 9 support this hypothesis.  In the top panel, the interaction between
ln(trailer share) and ln(outbound/inbound) is negative and significant for both medium and long
hauls.  Combined with the coefficient on ln(trailer share), one can compute the value of
outbound/inbound such that the marginal effect of ln(trailer share) on contractual form is equal to
zero.  This value is 0.49 for medium hauls, and 0.13 for long hauls; both of these are lower than the
minimum in the sample.  From the bottom panel, these results do not change qualitatively when one
replaces ln(trucks/area) and ln(outbound/inbound) with state fixed effects.  The outbound/inbound
ratio such that the marginal effect of ln(trailer share) on contractual form equals zero is 0.44 and 0.26
for medium and long hauls, respectively.   There is only a weak relationship between local market
conditions and the contract/common margin in states where the ratio of outbound to inbound
shipments is very low.  This relationship becomes stronger as this ratio increases, and is very strong
in states where this ratio is high.  This is exactly what one would expect if concerns about
appropriating the returns from investments in route-specific knowledge cause firms to substitute
formal contractual arrangements for simple spot arrangements.
5.  Conclusion
The contractual implications of hold-up-based theories extend well beyond the situations
examined by most of the existing empirical literature.  These theories explain differences in
contractual form even when quasi-rents are neither large nor appear over long horizons.  Their scope
approaches situations normally considered in light of search or switching cost models.  Contracts22
play a role in mitigating the inefficiencies identified within these other strands of the literature.
Quasi-rents do not have to be very large for firms to begin to substitute formal contractual
relationships for less formal incentive mechanisms such as self-enforcing arrangements.
Contracts have many potential roles.  Future work will investigate contractual form in light
of incentive issues other than hold-up, such as agency.  This work will test theoretical propositions
by examining empirical relationships between the adoption of monitoring technologies and changes
in contractual form.  These tests will lend further insights regarding the role of long-term contracts
and vertical integration in this industry that will complement the main result of this paper: that
contracts’ role as protectors of quasi-rents does become less important as quasi-rents decline, but
exists over a surprisingly large range.   23
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Table 1
Contractual Form, by Trailer Type, 1992
N Private Contract Common
32015 54.6% 21.1% 24.3% All
257 10.5% 50.6% 38.9% Auto Trailers
9856 38.8% 24.7% 36.5% Basic Van
1252 57.3% 18.5% 24.3% Specialized Vans
3224 55.2% 20.6% 24.3% Tank Trucks
3920 51.1% 28.9% 20.1% Refrigerated Van
5200 57.2% 22.9% 19.9% Platform
2670 69.2% 14.9% 15.9% Dump Trailer
5636 85.5% 6.7% 7.7% Specialized Trailers26
Table 2
Fraction Private, Contract -- Selected States
Trucks/
% Private % Common Developed Area
Bottom Five
82.3 13.8 2.380 New Mexico
54.4 18.3 2.387 North Dakota
62.1 21.4 2.511 South Dakota
66.2 17.2 2.717 Virginia
65.6 21.3 2.846 Massachusetts
66.1 18.4 Average
Top Five
51.7 24.9 9.270 Oregon
67.3 21.4 9.693 Nevada
36.1 37.2 10.452 Illinois
63.1 16.6 10.481 California
32.5 45.7 10.795 Utah
50.1 29.2 Average
Developed Area is defined as non-federal urban and built-up areas of 10 acres or greater.
See Statistical Abstract of the United States (1998), p. 237.27
Table 3
Trailer Shares
1992, by home base state of truck
Product Top Product Bottom 3 Min Top 3 Max Std. Dev. Mean Trailer Type
Concentration States Share States Share Share
0.087 Processed Food WY, ID, NM 6.7% TN, NJ, WI 54.4% 12.2% 29.2% Basic Van
0.568 Processed Food NM, RI, HI 3.5% UT, NE, MT 28.9% 5.2% 11.4% Refrigerated Van
0.107 Lumber NJ, WI, MA 8.8% HI, CA, MT 26.9% 4.1% 15.4% Platform
0.449 Building Materials ME, VT, GA 2.2% NV, HI, WV 27.0% 5.9% 8.3% Dump Trailer
1.000 Trans. Equip. IA, WY, WA 0.1% MI, NY, FL 2.6% 0.5% 0.7% Auto Trailer
Tank Trucks
0.308 Petroleum SD, OR, WI 3.3% LA, VT, WY 15.0% 2.9% 7.5% Tank Truck/Liquid
0.319 Building Materials RI, MI, HI 0.5% MT, MD, NV 3.9% 0.7% 1.7% Tank Truck/Dry
Specialized Vans
0.387 Processed Food NH, VT, MD 0.1% UT, MN, ME 15.1% 2.1% 1.2% Insulated Van
0.256 Household Goods VT, HI, IA 0.3% MS, CT, CO 6.0% 1.2% 2.5% Drop Frame Van
0.249 Logs NV, NE, DE 0.2% OR, ID, ME 5.6% 1.3% 1.3% Open Van
Specialized Trailers (selected)
0.637 Farm Products ME, CT, WV 0.2% ND, SD, NE 23.7% 5.5% 4.5% Grain Body
0.937 Livestock RI, MA, IL 0.1% UT, WY, ID 9.3% 2.1% 1.7% Livestock Trailer
0.854 Logs RI, NY, KS 1.1% OR, SC, ME 12.1% 3.5% 3.1% Logging Trailer28
Table 4
Contractual Form Proportions, 1992
by Trailer.  All States, Top 3 States.
Private Carriage Common Carriage
Top 3 States All States Top 3 States All States Trailer Type
23.2% 38.8% 54.2% 36.5% Basic Van
24.7% 51.1% 40.8% 20.1% Refrigerated Van
63.8% 57.2% 18.9% 19.9% Platform
63.4% 69.2% 17.6% 15.9% Dump Trailer
Specialized Vans
10.6% 46.7% 76.3% 31.2% Insulated Van
66.3% 55.5% 30.3% 29.8% Drop Frame Van
50.7% 70.7% 25.9% 9.4% Open Van
Specialized Trailers (selected)
9.0% 10.5% 56.6% 38.9% Auto Trailer
80.5% 80.1% 12.8% 11.9% Grain Body
78.3% 75.3% 17.6% 16.1% Livestock Trailer
71.7% 83.1% 8.1% 6.2% Pole/Logging Trailer
Tank Trucks
45.7% 55.9% 28.4% 24.7% Tank Truck/Liquid
35.1% 52.6% 36.0% 22.5% Tank Truck/Dry
"Top 3 States" are the states in which trucks using the specified trailer make up the largest fraction of the state’s tractor-trailer fleet.29
Table 5
Ordered Logits – 1992
Dependent Variable: Governance Form
Long Haul Only Medium Haul Only Short Haul Only
Contract/Private Common/Contract Contract/Private Common/Contract Contract/Private Common/Contract Margin
Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. Estimate
0.050 -1.403 0.071 -1.880 0.083 -1.472 C1
0.047 -0.131 0.059 -0.922 0.070 -0.635 C2
0.066 -0.200 0.067 0.025 0.113 1.057 0.188 1.468 0.208 1.236 0.244 0.809 Refrigerated Van
0.064 -0.470 0.064 -0.220 0.074 0.240 0.092 0.157 0.113 1.136 0.149 1.172 Platform
0.123 0.340 0.137 -0.131 0.105 0.346 0.130 0.019 0.140 1.744 0.172 1.446 Specialized Trailer
0.100 -0.759 0.099 -0.679 0.097 -0.638 0.115 -0.968 0.134 -0.084 0.161 -0.120 Tank Truck
0.139 -0.463 0.136 -0.856 0.162 -0.627 0.196 -0.732 0.233 0.082 0.334 0.751 Specialized Van
0.165 -0.935 0.160 -0.978 0.097 -0.657 0.117 -0.618 0.114 0.677 0.140 0.488 Dump Trailer
0.261 -3.350 0.173 -1.708 0.311 -3.574 0.231 -2.191 0.508 -1.252 0.911 0.350 Auto Trailer
0.102 -1.342 0.075 -1.409 0.119 -2.143 0.100 -2.097 0.128 -2.832 0.108 -2.739 Mixed Cargo
- - - - 0-50 Miles
- - - - 50-100 Miles
0.046 -0.437 0.055 -0.346 100-200 Miles
- - - - 200-500 Miles
0.040 -0.952 0.041 -0.647 >500 Miles
0.036 -0.421 0.035 -0.405 0.036 -0.332 0.043 -0.389 0.049 -0.209 0.060 -0.243 Ln(Trailer Density)
13512 8172 4430 -LogL30
Table 6
Trailer Density Probability Derivatives
Private Contract Common
Short Haul Trucks
0.784 0.101 0.115 Predicted Shares
-0.035 0.011 0.025 Probability Derivative
-4.5% 10.6% 21.5% Derivative/Share
Medium Haul Trucks
0.652 0.188 0.161 Predicted Shares
-0.075 0.023 0.052 Probability Derivative
-11.6% 12.2% 32.6% Derivative/Share
Long Haul Trucks
0.334 0.360 0.306 Predicted Shares
-0.094 0.008 0.086 Probability Derivative
-28.0% 2.1% 28.1% Derivative/Share
Note: All calculations use estimates from table 5.
Probability derivatives and predicted shares are calculated at mean values31
Table 7
Ordered Logits – 1992: Selected Coefficients
Dependent Variable: Governance Form
Contract/Private Common/Contract Contract/Private Common/Contract Contract/Private Common/Contract Margin
Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. Estimate
Short Haul Only
0.450 -0.922 0.470 -1.196 Ln(TD)*Ref. Van
0.106 -0.083 0.108 0.109 Ln(TD)*Basic Van
0.155 -0.296 0.223 -0.518 Ln(TD)*Platform
0.112 -0.044 0.134 0.025 Ln(TD)*Spec. Trail.
0.110 -0.278 0.132 -0.174 Ln(TD)*Tank
0.213 -0.151 0.323 -0.188 Ln(TD)*Spec. Van
0.112 -0.488 0.130 -0.981 Ln(TD)*Dump
- - - - Ln(TD)*Auto
0.065 0.102 0.080 0.002 0.063 -0.002 0.077 -0.100 Ln(Trailer Share)
0.096 -0.539 0.096 -0.446 Ln(Trucks/Area)
4309 4417 4407 -LogL
Medium Haul Only
0.207 -0.749 0.378 -0.408 Ln(TD)*Ref. Van
0.085 -0.563 0.093 -0.297 Ln(TD)*Basic Van
0.099 -0.446 0.128 -0.554 Ln(TD)*Platform
0.068 -0.224 0.087 -0.339 Ln(TD)*Spec. Trail.
0.075 -0.024 0.085 -0.141 Ln(TD)*Tank
0.142 -0.267 0.179 -0.540 Ln(TD)*Spec. Van
0.117 -0.640 0.140 -0.784 Ln(TD)*Dump
0.516 -0.828 0.328 -0.995 Ln(TD)*Auto
0.044 -0.159 0.054 -0.367 0.043 -0.168 0.053 -0.367 Ln(Trailer Share)
0.061 -0.664 0.072 -0.400 Ln(Trucks/Area)
8016 8134 8140 -LogL
Long Haul Only
0.090 -0.500 0.090 -0.366 Ln(TD)*Ref. Van
0.066 -0.682 0.064 -0.516 Ln(TD)*Basic Van
0.104 -0.156 0.105 -0.214 Ln(TD)*Platform
0.097 -0.192 0.120 -0.223 Ln(TD)*Spec. Trail.
0.090 -0.102 0.091 0.080 Ln(TD)*Tank
0.103 -0.442 0.097 -0.758 Ln(TD)*Spec. Van
0.256 -0.319 0.264 -0.936 Ln(TD)*Dump
0.348 -1.616 0.227 -0.687 Ln(TD)*Auto
0.047 -0.330 0.048 -0.365 0.046 -0.456 0.046 -0.531 Ln(Trailer Share)
0.057 -0.376 0.058 -0.201 Ln(Trucks/Area)
13282 13502 13464 -LogL
Yes No No State Fixed Effects?
Notes: All specifications include constants, a mixed cargo dummy, trailer dummies, and distance from home dummies, not reported here.
N = 10387 and 12600 for medium and long-haul specifications, respectively.  N = 7653 for the first short haul specification; observations of auto
trailers are dropped because the Ln(TD)*Auto parameters are not identified.  N = 7653 for the other short haul specifications.
The parameters on the 49 state fixed effects are constrained to be equal across the two margins in the specifications reported in the right panel.32
Lumber, Primary Metals Primary Metal Lumber
Table 8
Rail Share, (1-Truck Share) Regressions
Product Class
1-Truck Share Rail Share 1-Truck Share Rail Share 1-Truck Share Rail Share Dependent Variable
0.069 -0.036 0.114 0.009 -0.050 -0.016 C
0.067 0.109 0.126 0.120 0.047 0.065
0.700 0.163 -0.002 -0.483 0.733 0.287 Trailer Share
0.381 0.541 0.807 0.721 0.263 0.363
-0.024 0.048 0.031 0.044 0.006 0.007 Average Distance
0.017 0.037 0.036 0.034 0.010 0.011
34 22 39 32 36 29 N
0.07 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.18 0.04 R-Squared
Note: Average Distance is in hundreds of miles.
Data are from 1993 Commodity Flow Survey CD-Rom.
Bold denotes statistical significance using a one-tailed t-test of size 0.05; italic denotes significance of a t-test of size 0.133
Table 9
Ordered Logits – 1992: Selected Coefficients
Dependent Variable: Governance Form
Long Haul Only Medium Haul Only Short Haul Only
Common/Contract Common/Contract Common/Contract Margin
Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. Estimate
0.047 -0.506 0.053 -0.345 0.079 -0.066 Ln(Trailer Share)
0.062 -0.097 0.079 -0.301 0.111 -0.594 Ln(Trucks/Area)
1.996 3.043 2.444 3.849 3.307 18.180 Ln(Outbound/Inbound)
0.092 -0.244 0.110 -0.477 0.168 -0.065 Ln(TS)*Ln(Out/In)
0.229 -0.451 0.281 -0.613 0.381 -2.131 Ln(T/A)*Ln(Out/In)
13454 8155 4392 -LogL
12600 10387 7653 N
0.049 -0.355 0.053 -0.362 0.081 0.006 Ln(Trailer Share)
0.084 -0.265 0.097 -0.436 0.144 -0.280 Ln(TS)*Ln(Out/In)
13253 7996 4292 -LogL
12600 10387 7653 N
Note: 
In the bottom panel, 49 state fixed effects are included34






















Governance Share, Short Haul Trucks35






















Governance Share, Long Haul Trucks